

Big PE at the Peak. Rise of the AIP's.

Where do returns go from here?

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Industry Research Paper

Milestone Active Management, LLC is a family office investor in private equity focused on actively managing investments in the lower and mid markets. All opinions are those of Milestone Active Management, LLC.

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Private Equity Outlook

The Fall of Big PE; Rise of the "AIP's"

Private Equity (PE) has long provided institutional investors—mostly pension funds and retirement plans—with great returns and diversification. But the industry has changed and its not such an "alternative" investment anymore, at least

in terms of Big PE...which is now 22% of the size of the S&P. We believe that Big PE is at or near its peak and that forward returns will fall. We also believe that a new alternative PE strategy will rise for select investors—the AIP.

Our Thesis:

- (i) PE is principally Big funds that invest in Big deals (Big PE);
- (ii) Big PE returns will fall as a result of many factors, including their own historic success, and
- (iii) Aggregating Investment Platforms (AIP's) will emerge to exploit the new reality of PE—our coined name for a class of PE constructs designed to take advantage of today's market

AIPs: our newly established PE strategy for Family Office & Small Institutional (FOSI) investors. AIPs:

- 1) **Aggregate** like-minded FOSI investors on a platform to gain scale and diversification;
- 2) Are **managed** by a team far deeper and more focused in operations and growth than most PE funds;
- 3) **Encourage & leverage FOSI** industry **operating expertise** for deal vetting & ongoing operations
- 4) **Tactical Strategy centers on operating growth** vs financial engineering as with most Big PE;
- 5) **Target lower to mid-market PE** where less competition, lower price multiples, and 30X greater volume of potential targets exist

AIPs take advantage of the new reality in PE, delivering far better risk-adjusted returns for FOSI's

EXHIBIT1 AIP's versus Big PE - Apples and Oranges

Attribute	AIPs	Big PE			
Platform Sponsor Management	Operationally experienced and focused over- sight: including taking on managerial roles	Typically board level oversight: directing CEO and CFO to execute Big PE strategies.			
Investor Involvement	Key to strategy: leverage of deep FOSI industry experience in vetting and operations	None: Investors as LP's only			
Investment Size Target	Small to Medium Sized Deals	Big Deals			
Pressure on Purchase Price Multiples	Medium to Medium +	High to Very High			
Volume of Potential Targets	Significant: over 10% of all US companies	Low: Less than 1/3 of 1% of all US companies			
Leverage Sought	Medium	High			
Value Add Strategy	Operationally and growth focused: organic growth is the priority; tactics include expanding operations, hiring and upgrading talent	Financial engineering focused: where growth is not the priority, tactics include layoffs, spin offs, cost cutting, reducing R&D			
Investment Risk	Low to Medium: lowerpurchase prices, lower leverage and core strategy of growth is less dependent on economic cycles or interest rates	Medium to Very High: Paying peak purchase price multiples, assuming peak debt multiples, dependent on high leverage and an active IPO market.			

Thesis Support:

- 1) Big PE is at the Peak of its cycle. Its bigger, more concentrated and more risky than ever.
- 2) Why Big PE is set for a fall. Too much money chasing too few deals & too much easy debt.
- 3) A slow motion car crash.
 Why investors aren't headed for the door. Yet.

1. Big PE is at the Peak of its cycle.

It's bigger, more concentrated and more risky than ever.

- **PE assets (AUM) exploded** to \$2.4 Trillion, an increase of 42% or \$700 Billion since 2010¹. The entire S&P 500, by contrast is \$10.6 Trillion² (PE is 22.6% of S&P).
- Concentration is increasing³. Big PE holds > 80% of industry assets, and concentrates on a select few strategies that put big money to work quickly. Top five firms equal 13% of industry AUM (Exhibit 2).
- PE dry powder is at a record level: \$1.2 Trillion⁴, or just under 50% of all PE AUM.
- Deals are bigger than ever. M&A activity in 2015 is on pace to hit \$3.7 Trillion⁵, a record second only to 2007, the peak year of the last Private Equity bubble. In fact, up through 4/9/15 there were more deals over \$10 Billion⁶ than has ever been recorded.
- Fund size is bigger than ever. See Exhibit 2
 - Data from Bain⁷ suggests that deal size is up 30% over the past three years alone.



From Bain and Company Global Private Equity Report 2014:

"Although the number of buyout funds that closed last year increased only slightly to 168 (compared with about 140 each year since 2009), the amount of capital raised jumped 89% year over year to \$191 billion as money flowed disproportionately to bigger funds"....

"...<u>nine mega-funds</u> closed in 2013, attracting more than \$5 billion each and accounting for <u>48% of the total capital raised</u> by buyout funds. Among them was the largest buyout fund raised since the financial crisis..."

EXHIBIT 2

Vintage Era	Small	Mid-Market	Large	Mega
1992-1996	<\$200 MM	\$201 MM - \$500 MM	> \$501 MM	N/A
1997-2004	<\$300 MM	\$301 MM - \$750 MM	\$751 MM - \$2 Billion	> \$2 Billion
2005-2013	<\$500 MM	\$501 MM - \$1.5 Billion	\$1.6 MM - \$4.5 Billion	> \$4.5 Billion

Source: Prequin Ltd./ www.prequin.com; http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/Prequin definitions of fund size over time.

Concentration among leading Alternative Investment Firms

Film	Market Share	AUM* (\$ Billions)
Blackstone	4.1%	\$ 266
Carlyle	3.0%	\$ 189
Apollo	2.5%	\$ 161
Bridgewater Assoc.	2.0%	\$ 150
JP Morgan Asset Management	1.4%	\$ 91
Top 5 Firms	13.0%	\$ 857

Alternative Investment Funds rank and value, IBIS World, Private Equity report 2014



2. Why Big PE is set for a fall.


Too much money chasing too few deals, plus too much easy debt

- Purchase multiples are way up; above those at the peak of the last LBO bubble in 20088, a full turn higher than last year (2014 vs 2013)
- Debt is way up; above the LBO bubble peak in 20089 (Exhibit 3),
- Too Few Targets. Exhibit 4 displays the narrow target pool of Big PE versus AIP strategy target pool
- **Pressure to put out money** before investment periods expire¹⁰—or else funds must return unvested capital—which is also driving increased fund life—now at 13 years¹¹. Risk rises with longer hold periods
- Lack of Growth Focus. Many Big PE strategies center on financial engineering (ie Kraft deal), not growth. But cost cutting, layoffs and spin offs can only go so far and run out of steam after a few years... and then what?
- Big PE is more vulnerable to Interest rate swings. With high leverage and high purchase price multiples, expected interest rate increases (as soon as 3Q15¹²) will have the most impact on Big PE.

EXHIBIT3 Median EBITDA Multiples for Buyouts







3. A slow motion car crash.


Why investors aren't headed for the door. Yet.

- a. **Recent returns are strong**—Blackstone just paid out its largest ever quarterly dividend¹⁴. With LP's getting great returns today from yesterday's PE investments, they are less concerned about the tomorrow's market. But that's really **looking in the rear view mirror for future returns**.
- b. **Big Intuitions dominate Big PE** and are pressured to keep investing; Big PE is the easy call.
 - i. With an aging population, Big Institutions' retirement-dominated coffers are full
 - ii. Flight to Big PE: there is an assumption among large institutions that bigger is safer
 - iii. Bigger is easier: To invest in smaller PE, Big Investors have to write more, smaller checks, making it harder for them to manage a greater number of investments...

Said one long-term investor Bain interviewed last fall, "You have to kiss a lot of frogs at the smaller end of the market to get the commitment size you want. In the end, it may be just too much work."

- c. **Human nature is long on inertia and short memory.** "If it aint broke don't fix it". People don't run for the exits when they smell smoke...they wait until the fire is right in front of them. Of course, by then its too late.
- d. **Slow motion car crash**—A speeding car hitting the wall and bursting into flames is impossible to miss. Death by a thousand cuts is harder to notice.





Rise of the AIPs

AIP's—our coined name for Aggregating Investment Platforms (AIP's) will execute a highly differentiated strategy & should yield superior risk-adjusted returns for select investors

- a. Target market: mid to lower mid-market has lower price multiples and better target supply/demand dynamics
- b. Scale: Aggregating small institutions and family offices can replicate Big scale
- c. **Active Management:** to grow operations and add value the old fashioned way. Revenue growth not reliant on financial engineering or simply cost cutting.

AIPs are designed to take advantage of the new reality in PE and deliver far better risk adjusted returns for FOSI investors than Big PE in today's market environment

With our cautionary Thesis for Big PE, why consider any PE strategy?

- PE is still a strong strategy. Big PE is at its Peak, and as a sub-strategy of overall PE is "overbought".
- AIPs are a completely different animal. In today's Peak Big PE jungle, AIPs are simply better suited to thrive. PE remains a solid investment strategy (Figure 5, 6). Let's not confuse Big PE investing with other PE strategies.

Pension Fund Investment Return by Asset Class 10 year annualized returns

Public Equity	5.8%
Fixed Income	6.6%
Real Estate	6.7%
Private Equity	10.0%

Source: Private Equity Growth Capital Counsel; as of June 2012 Returns are net of management fees and carry

EXHIBIT 6 Alternative Asset Investment Returns: 1997-2011 Research from 2,465 pension funds over 15 year period

Hedge Funds	7.1%
Real Assets	9.5%
Private Equity	11.9%

Source: Defined Contribution Institutional Investment Association, Forbes 2013. Returns are net of management fees and carry

Anatomy of an AIP

AIPs are animals designed to thrive in this new, changed market environment. Some key distinctions:

EXHIBIT 7 Anatomy of an AIP

Attribute	AIPs				
Platform Management	 Operationally experienced & focused on enhancing growth Sponsors will have had experience running a company or division Not just board level involvement. "Roll up your sleeves" oversight 				
Investor Involvement - "not such a limited partner"	 Designed to lever deep operational experience of Family Offices in multiple verticals Platform actively seeks out industry domain experts in vetting process and operations Relationship between Sponsor and investor more of a partnership vs quarterly update Investors may be a material provider of proprietary dealflow; co-investment rights Strategy delivers deeper industry and operational experience across multiple sectors 				
Investment Size Target	EBITDA of between \$4MM to \$50MM TEV of between \$25MM to \$500MM				
Dealflow of Potential Targets	Unlike big PE which relies heavily on brokers, dealflow will rely more on direct & FOSI channels				
Leverage Sought	Debt to equity ratio will be far more conservative than typical Big PE				
Value Add	Operational professionalization is keyGrowth focus will be both on active management for organic growth as well as bolt ons				
Investment Risk	 Being closer to the steering wheel (operations), we can better manage unexpected bumps in the road By reducing risk with lower purchase multiples, less debt and more active management, operating management has more freedom to pursue growth strategies 				

Nothing is without risk. Some of the pros and con's of AIP's

EXHIBIT8 Select Pros and Cons

_	CON: More time and effort to deploy the same investment dollars
+	PRO: Superior risk/reward vs. Big PE: lower multiples and debt, targets are 30X as abundant
+	PRO: Differentiated Skills: Operational and growth focused
+	PRO: Investors are partners, not just LP's — and can add value
_	CON: Platforms will begin emerging; investors need to seek them out

Who will lead AIP sponsors or platforms?

Winning strategies will include:

- **First Movers**. Like any paradigm shift, first movers will have an advantage that, once attained, could last for decades. Note the current position of PE's early movers—like Bain, Blackstone.
- **Core investors.** Leaders will have assembled or have access to a core set of Family Office or Small Institutional investors sufficient to establish scale for an AIP platform.
- Family Offices with historic operational experience could aggregate like-minded families, each with different industry experience thus assembling professional teams to establish their own platforms.

AIP Platforms could emerge by combination or evolution.

- 1) Seasoned team of financial and operating managers to lead the platform
- 2) Forward thinking FOSI's:
 - Multi-family offices like GenSpring and WE Family Offices, or
 - Private client practices of firms like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, UBS or Credit Suisse

Why should platforms evolve or combine?

- 1) **Satisfy customer demand.** Family office and small institutional clients are aggressively seeking ways to make **direct investments** and **co-investments** consistent with AIP platform strategies
- 2) **Customer retention.** If these groups don't do it—someone else will—and will take their clients as a result
- 3) **New fees:** Investment banks and family offices can earn new, significant revenue streams by aggressively establishing market-leading AIP platforms. Big PE is a great business, on average delivering 40% net profit margins¹⁶ at the GP level AIPs could deliver these same GP level results to those that lead the way.



Past returns for PE have been strong, besting the major indices over the longer time frames and adding diversification due to their limited market correlation.

EXHIBIT 9 U.S. Private Equity and Venture Capital Index Returns (%) Periods ending September 30, 2013

	Quarter	YTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	10 Years	15 Years	20 Years	25 Years
USPE	5.1	13.3	17.2	15.7	11	14.2	12	13.5	13.4
USVC	6.5	14	15.1	14.4	7.5	8.6	26.1	30	20.2
Other Indices									
DJIA	2.1	17.6	15.6	14.9	9.9	7.7	6.9	10	11
NASDAQ Composite*	10.8	24.9	21	16.8	12.5	7.8	5.5	8.3	9.5
Russell 2000 Composite	10.2	27.7	30.1	18.3	11.2	9.6	8.9	9	9.8
S&P 500	5.2	19.8	19.3	16.3	10	7.6	5.3	8.8	10

Sources: Cambridge Associates LLC, Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Frank Russell Company, Standard and Poor's, and Thomson Reuters Datastream.

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